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FORM 100-10

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY

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(E4)

TO: The Secretary, GDR  
GDR

JUN 2 1961 GER

THROUGH: S/S *mm*

FROM: EUR - Foy D. Kohler *FDK*

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Ambassador Grewe on Friday, June 23,  
~~at 3:00 P.M.~~

Ambassador Grewe has asked to see you in order to hand over personally the German response to our request for German views on the appropriate role of the Federal Republic in connection with military action which might be taken as part of our contingency plans for Berlin. You will recall this was a subject which you discussed with Foreign Minister von Brentano at the time of Chancellor Adenauer's visit to this country in mid-April.

Ambassador Grewe will probably also wish to exchange views on the Berlin problem in general as we see it developing at this time. He will, of course, have noted the statements which you will have made at your press conference this afternoon.

The Ambassador may also wish to give you the initial German reaction to the draft of a proposed reply to the Soviet Aide Memoire which we distributed in a Four-Power Working Group meeting last Saturday. In the absence of British views, we will not have been able to have a further Four-Power meeting prior to your conversation with Grewe, and he may, therefore, choose to use the occasion for the first presentation of the German reaction to our draft. One aspect of this subject which seems particularly to be troubling the Germans is the effect which our reply will have on the timing of their response to the Soviet memorandum of February 17, 1961. Bonn's telegram 2119 of June 16 (attached as Tab A) indicates the degree of concern and suspicion which the Germans have managed to conjure up on this point. In the Four-Power discussion last Saturday, Ambassador Grewe pointed out that there was considerable pressure on the German Government internally to send forward the long-delayed reply to the Soviet memorandum. Despite certain German hesitations, the consensus of the meeting was that the timing of the German response could only finally be decided in the light of the timing of our response. My suggestion that there might perhaps be a two-day gap between the two, with the German reply following ours, elicited Grewe's comment that their message would lose all its impact if it came in the wake of the American reply. As far as the substance of the German reply is concerned, language has been quadripartitely agreed. However, the Germans themselves have indicated that they wished to make an addition which they did not have available at the Saturday meeting. Further discussion of their supplementary language will accordingly be necessary at the next meeting of the Working Group.

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EUR:GER: M. J. Hillenbrand

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As you are aware, after the speech by Senator Mansfield on Berlin, Ambassador Grewe came in, under instruction, to see Under Secretary Bowles to express German concern over the Mansfield "proposal" and to request that a clarifying statement be made by the United States Government. This seems to have been pretty well taken care of by your remarks in response to the query directed at you following a meeting of the Senate Appropriations Committee, as well as by Link White's statement at his noon briefing on June 16 (DEPTEL 492 to Berlin, 2291 to Bonn, reporting these statements is attached as Tab B). Ambassador Grewe may take the occasion to express concern of his Government over the continuing discussion of the Mansfield speech and the support being given to it by certain columnists and members of the United States Senate.

Attachments:

Tab A - Bonn's Telegram 2119.

Tab B - Department's Telegram 492 to Berlin repeated to Bonn as 2291.

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